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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
REX VANCE, Sheriff of Salt Lake 
:County, State of Utah, 
Case No. 15944 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS, appeals from the 
, dismissal of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After denial of the appellant's Motion for Continuance 
and following proffer of evidence by the appellant's counsel, the 
iht of Habeas Corpus was dismissed and the appellant was remanded 
to the custody of the respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the District Court's dismissal 
::~is petition reversed and to have the Petition for a lvrit of 
ca'leas Corpus reinstated with an order granting appellant the re-
-~sted pre-trial discovery. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 26, 1978, the appellant filed a Petition for a Wri: 
of Habeas Corpus (R. 2). On June 18, 1978, the appellant filed a 
Motion for Production of Documents pertaining to appellant's claim 
in the lower court (R. 4). On June 22, 1978, the appellant filed 
a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the appellant 
from being taken out of the state while the proceedings were ongoim' 
(R. 7). 
On June 29, 1978, Judge Peter F. Leary of the Third 
Judicial District Court heard the Motion for a Temporary Restrainb; 
Order (R. 8). At that time the appellant was given the documents 
requested in the Motion for Production of Documents and the respon· 
dent filed an Answer to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
In addition, the Court granted a temporary restraining order for thE 
period of one week and set the matter over for hearing to July 6, 
1978 (R. 8). 
On July 3, 1978, the appellant filed a series of inter-
rogatories (R. ll). On July 5, 1978, the appellant filed a Motion 
for a Continuance on the matter to be heard on July 6 (R. 15). 
On July 6, 1978, the matter came on for hearing on the 
appellant's Motion for a Continuance (R. 28). That motion was den~' 
(R. 34). The matter then proceeded immediately to a hearing. 
Appellant did not call any witnesses. The appellant proffered t~d 
the evidence that would have been available to him had the inter-
rogatories been answered by the respondent (R. 32). At this ?oir.: 
- 2 -
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the Court denied the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (R. 35). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO CONDUCT 
LIMITED DISCOVERY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF APPOINTED 
COUNSEL WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO HIS CLAIM ON HIS 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
The appellant in this case has contested the legality of 
his possible extradition as provided in Utah Code Ann. §77-56-10 
(1953 as amended) by filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
alleging that his arrest and restraint were illegal (R. 2). 
Petitioner contended that he was not within the demanding state 
(California) at the time that the offense whjch he had been accused 
of committing was perpetrated (R. 29). Pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the appellant filed interrogatories on 
the respondent on July 3, 1978 (R. 11). On July 5, 1978, the 
appellant filed a motion for a continuance because the interrogatories 
had not yet been answered (R. 12). The motion was denied on July 6, 
1978 (R. 12). The Court found that the State had made its prima 
facie case and then gave its reasoning for denying the motion for 
a continuance: 
And it would seem to the Court that the items 
that you're suggesting to the Court are matters 
that vou desire to discover are also matters that 
would~be well within the --within your client's 
knowledge. At least I don't suppose that if you 
think he was under surveillance or something that 
he could itemize that, but he certainly must have 
some idea where he was at the time of the alleged 
offense. 
- 3 -
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Now, if there are witnesses that he could 
tell you about or so on, I think that he's had 
adequate time to do that. The Court does not 
think that this is the appropriate proceeding 
for any fishing expedition upon his part in 
connection with any prosecution, nor do I think 
that it's the responsibility of the State of 
Utah to endeavor to obtain any information for 
you in connection with these matters. 
The State of Utah has done its job in 
connection with the matter in presenting or making 
a prima facie case, and that apparently has been 
done through the filing of the various documents. 
And I am assuming that, having perused those, 
you certainly have not indicated any objection 
to the documents as such. And unless you have 
something else, why, I'll make a ruling in 
connection with the matter. (R. 31-32). 
In other words, the Court felt that the discovery was improper and 
that was the Court's basis for denying the appellant's motion. 
The question of the applicability of civil discovery to 
habeas corpus proceedings has never been dealt with directly by ~L 
Court. However, Rule 8l(a) of the URCP provides: 
Special Statutory Proceedings. These Rules shall 
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except 
in so far as such Rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for pro-
cedure by reference to any part of the former 
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be 
in accordance with these Rules. 
Habeas Corpus procedures are covered by Rule 64B of the 
URCP. The procedures for the petition and answer are covered by 
that rule, but the rule does not describe any other procedures 
that are to be applied. The other procedures to be applied in 
habeas corpus hearings must be governed by the URCP. Such pro-
- 4 -
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cedures must include discovery by the parties. 
In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 16 Utah 2d 136, 396 P.2d 870 
(1964), this Court noted in dictum that such procedures may be 
applicable in habeas corpus. The Court stated: 
Dictum-wide, nonetheless, we observe that 
petitioner urges that habeas corpus proceedings 
are civil, not criminal; that the Rules of 
Civil Procedure are applicable; that so being, 
his motions to entertain the discovery process 
of interrogatories, deposition and examination 
of documents were violated by their denial. 
Everything petitioner requested by motion was 
available to him as a matter of public record. 
396 P.2d at 870. 
Since this was a special statutory proceeding and the 
special rules applicable to such proceedings do not conflict with 
the application of Rule 33 of the URCP as was sought in this case, 
the appellant was entitled to the discovery under Rule 8l(a) of 
the URCP. Furthermore, the answers to the interrogatories sought 
here do not conflict with the exception to Rule 8l(a) which provides 
"except in so far as such Rules are by their nature inapplicable". 
The applicability has been determined by the United States Supreme 
Court which has held general civil discovery to be inappropriate in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. However, the Court did find, 
that in appropriate circumstances, a district 
court, confronted by a petition of habeas 
corpus which establishes a prima facie case 
for relief, may use or authorize the use of 
suitable discovery procedures, including 
interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to 
elicit facts necessary to help the court to 
'diapose of the matter as law and justice 
require'. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 
- 5 -
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at 290, 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 
reh. den. 394 U.S. 1025, 23 L.Ed. 2d 50, 
89 S.Ct. 1623 (1969). 
In that case, the United States Supreme Court found that general 
civil discovery was not appropriate on habeas corpus for three 
basic reasons. The first was because of the history of both the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal habeas corpus made 
such discovery inapplicable. The second reason was that some forns 
of discovery would be inappropriate in habeas corpus proceedings. 
The final reason was that there was a great deal of potential for 
abuse of discovery by prisoners who would be acting without the 
guidance and restraint of members of the bar. 
However, the Court in Harris v. Nelson, supra, did not 
find, as noted above, that civil discovery was completely inappro-
priate in habeas corpus proceedings. 
The Court held that the district courts are to have dis-
cretion in allowing such discovery and stated: 
We do not assume that courts in the exercise 
of their discretion will pursue or authorize 
pursuit of all allegations presented to them. 
We are aware that confinement sometimes induces 
fantansy which has its basis in the paranoia 
of prison rather than in fact. But where 
specific allegations before the court show 
reason to believe that the petitioner may, 
if the facts are fully developed, be able to 
demonstrate that he is confined illegally and 
is therefore, entitled to relief, it is the duty 
of the court to provide the necessary facilities 
and procedures for an adequate inquiry. 
Obviously, in exercising this power, the co~rt 
may utilize familiar procedures, as approprlate, 
whether these are found in the civil or criminal 
rules or else where in the "usages and principles 
of lmv." (footnote omitted) 394 U.S. at 300. 
- 6 -
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The Court found that the federal district courts had the power 
to allow such limited discovery under the All Writs Act,28 United 
States Code §1651. 
Even though Utah does not have a statute similar to the 
All Writs Act, such limited discovery may still be appropriate. 
The Colorado Supreme Court was faced with the same problem in the 
case of Hithe v. Nelson, 471 P.2d 596 (1970). In that case, as in 
the case at hand, the habeas corpus petitioner was challenging his 
being held for extradition. The Court held that the habeas corpus 
petitioner does not have an "unrestricted and unmodified" right to 
civil discovery, but discovery would be available if it was "clearly 
shown that the matters sought to be discovered will be relevant 
to the very narrow issue of a habeas corpus hearing", 471 P. 2d at 
598. 
In the case at hand the appellant was seeking discovery 
of only those matters relevant to his claim. He sought to discover 
the time and place of the occurrence of the crime he was accused 
of committing and whether the government had him under surveillance 
at that time, and if he was under surveillance he sought to discover 
the government's information as to this whereabouts. Consequently, 
the fears expressed in Harris v. Nelson, supra, were not present 
here because the petitioner was seeking very limited discovery and 
because the discovery was conducted under the guidance and restraint 
of counsel, thus minimizing the potential for abuse. 
This information was necessary for the appellant's case 
- 7 -
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for several reasons. The first is that the government's informatic 
may allow the appellant to prove his case without having to waive 
his privilege against self incrimination. The second is that 
such evidence may be regarded by the court as more credible than 
the appellant's assertions which the court may feel are self -servin; 
in nature. Finally, since the appellant is presently incarcerated 
in the Salt Lake County Jail and the crime was alleged to have 
occurred in California such discovery may have been a great aid 
to the appellant and to the court by helping him locate evidence 
at a minimal expense. For these reasons, the trial court connnitted 
error in not allowing the appellant to conduct the limited discover;. 
which he sought. This error was prejudicial because without the 
information sought, the appellant was completely unable to meet his 
burden of proof and with such information the burden may have been 
met. The trial court's ruling must be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court to allow the appropriate discovery 
and a hearing on the appellant's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The court order denying appellant's motion for contin-
uance to allow him to conduct limited discovery was an abuse of 
discretion. The discovery was of a very limited nature and it 
is obvious that the information was readily available. This is 
because it had to be in the possession of either the Utah or 
California authorities. Consequently, the delay in obtaining the 
- 8 -
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information would have been minimal. When such delay is balanced 
against the loss the appellant incurred by having his petition 
denied, it becomes obvious that the Court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion for continuance and as a result denying 
the discovery which would follow from that continuance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 9 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
